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[30 ELR 10909]
Theory Becomes Practice
Of all the proliferating ideas for reinventing environmental regulation, none are more portentous than those grouped loosely under the
heading "civic environmentalism." In a nutshell, such proposa's urge the delegation of crucial decisions and their implementation to
grassroots groups of interested parties who would collaborate in the development of creative solutions to the problems that have
stymied traditional regulation.1
From the perspective of their sponsors, nothing less than the reawakening of American democracy is at stake. Indeed, the most
enthusiastic proponents believe that embrace of such approaches has the potential to render irrelevant the fundamental premises of the
existing regulatory system, from the concept of a Tragedy of the Commons to the fear of a race-to-the-bottom if regulatory authority is
devolved.2
Last April, in the midst of a political firestorm provoked by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) latest efforts to
implement a granddaddy of traditional regulatory programs—the establishment of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) under the
Clean Water Act (CWA)—powerful federal lawmakers invoked civic environmentalism to justify legislation that would stop the
Agency in its tracks, redirecting its efforts to improve water quality.3 Clearly, the academy's enthusiasm for this bold new direction has
filtered into the legislative arena, and is likely to propel civic environmentalism to the front of the line as a key alternative when the
major environmental statutes are reauthorized.4
The outcome of the electoral contest between Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush will influence these
developments, although pundits may overestimate the differences in their policies toward reinvention when in power. Both men face
enormous pressure to do something drastic about the existing regulatory regime. Even hopeful supporters of Vice President Gore
cannot ignore the implications of these reform campaigns, spearheaded by heavily regulated industries and some states. Indeed, Gore's
modus operandi as presidential understudy has been to struggle to get out in front of such trends; witness the National Performance
Review and the Administration's pledge to deliver "cleaner, cheaper, smarter regulation."5
This Dialogue argues that while most civic environmentalists are idealistic and sincere, their determination to ignore the nasty details of
implementing their proposals has made it far too easy for their ideas to be co-opted by strong political forces with very different
agendas. Unless civic environmentalists grapple with the difficult problem of making their theories operational, they should be held
responsible for the inevitable corruption of those ideals. "Accountability" and "public participation" are euphemisms in serious writing
on the potential of civic environmentalism. Achieving these goals in any form other than window dressing for deals negotiated by
industry and government will require a commitment of time and money that civic environmentalists typically ignore.
The Dialogue begins by considering the implications of the Clinton Administration's pledge to deliver "cleaner, cheaper, smarter"
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regulation, which has become the mantra of the reinvention movement. It then reviews a representative sampling of the literature on the
civic republican revival in American law, which set the stage for the development of [30 ELR 10910] civic environmentalism as a
specific application of those ideas. The Dialogue describes the principles that animate the reforms proposed by civic environmentalists
and explains how these principles have been applied in recent federal legislation. The Dialogue concludes with an analysis of what it
would take to have the public actually participate in accountable reinvention of traditional regulation.
Cleaner. Cheaper. Smarter.
The Clinton Administration's promise of cleaner, cheaper, smarter regulation is a three-legged proposition, with an emphasis on the
adjective smart as the means for delivering both clean and cheap. When you think about it, this formulation is nothing less than
audacious. It essentially claims that we need not sacrifice any positive attribute of the current system when we reinvent it, but instead
will achieve significantly better results for less money because we will adopt more creative approaches.
Many constituencies would undoubtedly settle for plain, old, cheaper regulation. While few admit to the view that we have overdone
environmental protection, it is perfectly respectable to believe that we have achieved 90% to 95% of what we set out to do, and should
take care not to squander money on gilding the lily. A close cousin of this rationale is that we have targeted the wrong problems and
could either save or profitably redeploy our financial resources by developing better priorities.
Some constituencies would emphasize cleaner regulation, without caring how much cheaper it might be. Trained to avoid sounding like
advocates of big and expensive government, they nevertheless begin with the premise that many unconquered crises still confront us,
from contaminated drinking water supplies to irreversibly damaged ecosystems to the catastrophic effects of global warming. In a
sense, this perspective runs parallel to the notion that we are tackling problems in the wrong order, although the caucus for cleaner
regulation—national and local environmental and grass-roots citizen groups—would be wary of any relaxation of vigilance regarding
problems we ostensibly have at bay.
Still others would focus primarily on smarter regulation. Professional policymakers who believe in sophisticated, new approaches to
public administration, as well as economists who have long advocated market-based alternatives to command and control, decry the
inefficiency and complexity of the existing system. They crave new approaches to formulating policy as well as new ideas for the
substance of those decisions.
When it packaged these three discrete missions in a single, indivisible pledge, the Clinton Administration framed the debate, not just
for its two terms in office, but for the foreseeable future. To satisfy the most popular and widely accepted test for effective reform,
reinvention must cost less and deliver more protection, leveraging any potential discrepancy between these two goals by adopting
miraculously efficient approaches to public and private governance. Or, in more crass terms, the widespread public support for
environmental protection, combined with the potent and growing industry rebellion against traditional regulation and the congressional
majority's distaste for "big government," mean that EPA must embrace these conflicting agendas, a difficult task in the best of times
and a nearly impossible chore at the moment.
To clarify the implications of this dilemma on the implementation—and corruption—of civic environmentalism, the theory, in all its
glory, must be defined.
Defining Civic Environmentalism
Republican Roots
Civic environmentalism is the progeny of a modern revival of civic republicanism, a political movement tracing its roots to the struggle
between the Framers of the U.S. Constitution over the relationship of citizens and their government.6 Civic republicans are devotees of
Thomas Jefferson's conception of the nation-state, where the role of government, especially national government, is limited and public
affairs are conducted by an informed and engaged citizenry.7 This citizenry manages to overcome the selfish interests of each
individual member, inspiring thegroup to act on the basis of a shared vision of the common good. In other words, democracy is
achieved through the collaborative negotiation at the grass-roots level of solutions that are best for society. Central to these theories is
the belief that rational dialogue among enlightened citizens will develop a definition of the common good, as well as the means
necessary to obtain it.8
In the Framers' day, civic republicanism was grounded in pre-industrial agrarian culture and adopted a hostile attitude toward
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industrialization and the premises of laissez-faire capitalism.9 This thread runs throughout the development of the movement, with
modern republicans, sometimes labeled "populists," yearning for the quality of life before big cities and big corporations undermined
the social fabric.10
Civic republicanism also developed in reaction to the alternative vision of the nation-state advanced by James Madison, who
emphasized the importance of a central government that would ensure the organization of public affairs by civilian professionals to spur
economic development at home and abroad.11 Madison and his followers believed that the ideal democratic system is pluralistic, with
the three branches of government mediating the demands of understandably [30 ELR 10911] selfish interest groups.12 Pure pluralists
reject the notion that the common good can be derived by collaboration among citizens because they doubt that citizens are capable of
such consistent virtue.
The upshot of Jefferson versus Madison was a hybrid system of government designed to reconcile two potentially conflicting ideals:
first, the American people arepolitically free in the sense that they are governed by themselves collectively and, second, their political
freedom is ensured because the country is governed by the rule of law, as opposed to the whims of the majority.13 Modern republicans
are convinced that Madison got the better of this compromise. They believe that "corporate domination, empire, the growth of
regulatory bureaucracy . . . [and the] closing of the old frontier" threaten to swamp the increasingly fragile foothold that grass-roots
civic virtue occupies in public life.14
Modern republicans argue that the unrestricted growth of government has permitted politicians elected by the people to delegate the
protection of the common good to masses of faceless bureaucratic experts. Not only is the growth of the bureaucracy anti-democratic, it
has produced a citizenry alienated from its government to a dangerous degree. Equally distressing, government has become captive to a
complicated and unworkable regulatory system that costs the nation dearly in economic terms.15
Obviously, this grossly oversimplified description of the dialogue between Jefferson, Madison, and their followers barely scratches the
surface of these issues. For example, it does not consider the implications of the Worldwide Web for the further maturation of the
world's most successful democracy. This development rivals the Industrial Revolution in posing extraordinarily difficult challenges for
America's hybrid government. Consider the proposal made by self-described populist Ross Perot that we make important decisions by
plebiscite, conducted online immediately following abbreviated television debates.16 While not yet accorded serious consideration, such
ideas have the potential to revolutionize the way we make decisions, for better or worse, deepening the import of a return to civic
republican methods for resolving policy disputes now processed by the administrative state.
But this bare bones summary of the tension between republican and pluralist thought suffices to lay the foundation for a more detailed
examination of civic environmentalism, with the addition of two crucial caveats that complicate the development of modern republican
doctrine.
First, Jefferson's republican vision encompassed a white, male, landed gentry, the only true "citizens" of that period. The assertion that
citizens, deliberating as a group of enlightened equals, will act on behalf of the common good, is far more difficult to achieve in a
society as diverse as ours. Indeed, classic republican theory dating back to Jefferson's day has a legacy of ousting all those whose
"defect of understanding, foreignness of outlook, subservience of position, or corruption of interest" would disrupt what Professor
Frank Michelman calls the community's "normative unity."17
The second, closely related point is that Madison's belief in the rule of law was translated into the protection of the rights of minorities,
a goal that has grown in importance since the Framers' day. In other words, we have come to expect that it is the government's
responsibility to ensure that the majority's definition of the common good preserves the autonomy of the individual, as well as the civil
rights of the disadvantaged.
Modern civic republican theorists have struggled with both issues, which, in a sense, are the flip sides of the same dilemma: is there a
way to include representatives of diverse or disadvantaged constituencies in the grass-roots collaboration that will define the public
good without reaching a stalemate or having more powerful constituents override their needs?
In response, some have turned the civic republican criticism of the administrative state on its head, going so far as to suggest that the
bureaucrats themselves are proxies for the average working citizen, contributing an enlightened commitment to the public interest to
their collaboration with other constituencies.18 But other theorists are unwilling to accept this dilution of republican ideals, and instead
argue for radical changes that would reduce adversarial decisionmaking, give bureaucrats the discretion to override rigid command and
control requirements, and inspire self-selected participants to develop more creative solutions at the local level.19
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In this second formulation, citizen representatives would be recruited to participate in collaborative solutions to the problems now
addressed by bureaucrats in adversarial rulemakings. Some might come from organized public interest groups, although modern
republicans question, without ever resolving, whether such professional advocates truly represent the public's interests, or whether they
are merely another version of the special interests that are anathema to republican ideals.20 This assertion leads in turn to the quixotic
notion that "real" citizens should be recruited, [30 ELR 10912] but the argument typically trails off at this point, without specifying in
any convincing detail how such an ideal could be accomplished.21
Conscious that they need evidence to support their assertions that collaborative decisionmaking is better than traditional rulemaking,
modern republicans have invoked such environmental examples as Project XL, an EPA program involving site-specific regulatory
exemptions in exchange for "superior" environmental performance, and recent regulatory negotiations that developed rules in such
areas as equipment leaks and wood burning stoves.22 These examples involved incremental approaches to reform, in contrast to the
revision of a major regulatory program. Whether such limited and expensive methods are worth pursuing is a subject for another day.23
However, it is fair to observe that modern republicans do not devote much attention to the question of when grass-roots collaboration
would not be appropriate, an issue that will grow in importance if their ideas are adopted by those with the power to implement them.
Environmental Applications
Civic environmentalism is a relatively new body of ideas, and it is easy to select three of the most prominent examples of literature in
the area. The first two were written by people who work in Washington, and the third by academics at institutions outside the Capital.
By far the most nuanced and meticulously researched work was done by DeWitt John, a senior official at the National Academy of
Public Administration (NAPA), whose 1994 book, Civic Environmentalism, Alternatives to Regulation in States and Communities,
continues to be the most reliable reference on the subject.24 John views civic environmentalism as an approach that arises organically
from traditional regulatory processes and then recedes, depending upon the developmental stage of the environmental problem that is
being addressed. For example, in two of his three case studies on the subject—controlling nonpoint pollution from agricultural sources
in Iowa and the destruction of ecosystems in the Florida Everglades—he acknowledges that a return to traditional regulation is likely to
occur when civic environmental approaches run their course.25
John asserts that there are "five distinctive features of civic environmentalism":
1. A focus on the unfinished business of nonpoint problems, pollution prevention, and protecting ecosystems;
2. Extensive use of nonregulatory tools;
3. Interagency and intergovernmental cooperation;
4. A search for alternatives to political confrontations; and
5. A new role for the federal government as a participant in decisions made at the state or local level.26
The second group includes the most consistent proponents of civic environmentalism in Washington circles these days, advocating their
ideas on Capitol Hill, at downtown think tanks, and before any other policy group that will listen. Housed at the Progressive Policy
Institute, they are led by Debra Knopman, a former official at the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), who describes her work as
"building a central political coalition" around "second-generation" environmental policies.27
Like John, Knopman and her colleagues recognize that "not all environmental issues are amenable to civic treatment."28 They
acknowledge that traditional regulatory programs, such as the "money and legal hooks of the [CWA]," have been "vital for dealing with
urban wastewater treatment and rogue industrial dischargers" and even make a plug for "leveraging Superfund's liability provisions" in
the service of faster cleanup of contaminated urban property or brownfields.29 However, again like John, they contend that a new breed
of environmental problems, especially nonpoint runoff from facilities near sensitive surface waters, require innovative approaches:
For the federal government to try to force compliance from the small-scale farmers, suburban gardeners, and small-scale
businessmen who constitute non-point sources would be the public policy equivalent of herding cats. . . . Government's
role is to organize legal tools and financial resources to allow homegrown solutions to flourish. The bottom-line measure
of success for civic environmentalism is environmental and economic improvement.30
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Knopman and her colleagues have no patience for extremists "from the left and the right," disparaging the right for attacking all federal
environmental regulations "as if [they] exist solely to deprive private firms and their owners of their liberty," and the left for implying
that "all attempts to devolve environmental policymaking authority are merely pretexts for environmental degradation."31
Finally, offering a far bolder prescription for replacing traditional regulation with "democracy," is the "backyard environmentalism"
advocated by Charles Sabel, Archon Fung, and Bradley Karkkainen.32 Sabel is a well-established political scientist on the faculty of
Columbia Law School, Karkkainen is a lawyer who also teaches at Columbia, and Fung is a political scientist teaching at the Kennedy
School of Government. Undoubtedly because they are not Washington "insiders" and also have relatively limited backgrounds in
environmental policy wars, they are uninterested in an incremental blending of civic environmental and traditional [30 ELR 10913]
approaches. Rather, they tout a "fundamental reorientation" of the system, one which "replaces regulation based on central commands
with a combination of local experimentation and centralized pooling of experience":
In this new architecture—we will call it a rolling-rule regime—regulators use reports on proposals and outcomes to
periodically reformulate minimum performance standards, desirable targets, and paths for moving from the former to the
latter. In pursuing these targets as they see best, local actors provide the information necessary for regulators to revise
their standards and goals, and receive information on the performance of others that guides further experimentation. . . .
The rolling-rule regime should not be confused with voluntarism, if that term is understood to imply the abdication of
public authority and responsibility to private actors . . . . For while the rolling-rule regime radically expands the bounds
of local autonomy and demands deep participation by private as well as public actors, it also requires accountability.
Central authorities ensure that local units live up to their commitments by coordinating their activities, monitoring their
performance, pooling their experiences, and enforcing feasible standards . . . . But unlike conventional, hierarchical
forms . . . rolling-rule regulation creates a collaborative and mutual accountability of center to parts, parts to center, parts
to other parts, and all to the whole enterprise—and to the public generally.33
Jefferson would be proud.
To fully evaluate the validity of these theories, more empirical research must be done, especially with respect to civic
environmentalists' rather extravagant claims regarding the performance of such paragons as the Chesapeake Bay Program.34 However,
before that analysis occurs, and at the threshold of any examination of what civic environmentalism has to offer, is the question of
precisely who should participate in the formulation of collaborative, innovative, place-based solutions.
Knopman and her colleagues come the closest to sitting out this essential aspect of the debate. The poster child of their piece, former
state senator Bernie Fowler, is an icon of Maryland politics long associated with efforts to reclaim and protect the Chesapeake Bay.35
But by reason of celebrity and election to political office alone, he is hardly an example of the average citizen chosen (or even selfselected) at random. As for the Chesapeake Bay Program itself, it is sponsored and staffed primarily by federal and state bureaucrats
and the extent to which it has engaged average citizens, or even professional environmentalists, in the process of making decisions that
translate into tangible activities, remains to be documented.36
Once again staking out a relatively moderate approach, John suggests that the most important protagonists in his version of civic
environmentalism are typically elected officials, state and local regulators, or professionals employed by a range of private-sector
organizations.37 John is especially impressed with the efforts of the second group, whom he describes as a "shadow community" of midlevel, career government officials, who "continue to work while the spotlight of public attention shies on itinerant politicians and
executive directors," serving as a consistent source of "new policy ideas."38 Thus, John's brand of civic environmentalism does not
conform to pure civic republican ideals.39
As one might expect, Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen brook no such equivocation, labeling their version of the doctrine "backyard
environmentalism" to emphasize their commitment to the participation of any and all average citizens in republican collaborations:
For two decades, residents of Woburn, Love Canal, and countless other communities across the country have organized
to reclaim authority over their lived environment. These pioneers of civic environmental activism typically fought to
keep harmful activity out of their neighborhoods . . . In their struggles to protect themselves and their children from
poisoned air, soil, and water, ordinary citizens [have been] pitted against certified experts from corporations, government,
and even big environmental organizations. . . . Citizens now face the daunting task of determining what should occur in
their backyards . . . They must transform their traditionally antagonistic relationships with experts into partnerships for
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environmental protection . . . They need to fuse the broad experience of professional practitioners with the contextual
intelligence that only citizens possess.40
Just how will average citizens meet these challenges? Will they get help, or are they to depend on their inherent "contextual
intelligence" to overcome "certified experts"? Do Sabel and his colleagues presume that federal, state, and local bureaucrats are on the
citizens' "side," or do they think that the bureaucrats have independent agendas? Perhaps most significantly of all, assuming that the
toughest problems civic environmentalism has yet to tackle involve scientific and technical issues that are much in dispute, how will a
citizen's contextual intelligence match the expertise of those representing the entities that must be persuaded to spend resources to abate
such problems?41
Sabel and his colleagues have no convincing answers to these questions, except to contend that in exchange for relief from "top-down"
national regulation, "local actors" will agree to "pool information on their performance, plans, and metrics—on how they are doing,
how they plan to improve, and what standards they use to assess performance."42 All of this useful information would be reported to a
"central monitor" who will use it to determine, in consultation with "local actors," what "minimally acceptable levels of performance"
should be sought.43 As for the average citizen participant, [30 ELR 10914] "in a performance-based regime, the citizen is called on not
merely to express an opinion—or demand a solution—but to help formulate and implement solutions."44
Even if one assumes for the moment that "second-generation" problems involve much smaller commercial enterprises than firstgeneration problems, it is misleading and disingenuous to pretend that these smaller sources are tractable participants in either the
development or disclosure of all the information that will be needed to craft better solutions. To use the example most often cited by
civic republicans, a major category of nonpoint sources that threaten the Chesapeake Bay watershed are poultry farmers who run very
small enterprises at the direction and for the benefit of very large retail marketing companies.45 They are ferociously opposed to any
local requirements that might diminish their competitiveness with farmers in neighboring political jurisdictions.46 Further, although the
Blue Ribbon Commission appointed by Maryland Governor Parris Glendening recommended that the state take immediate action to
reduce farm runoff thought to contribute to high nutrient levels in the Chesapeake Bay, it also acknowledged that a large agenda of
research remained to be conducted.47 The upshot is that wherever the debate over how to solve second-generation problems occurs, it
will require everyone involved to revisit, again and again, highly complex questions regarding the pollution's effects, the efficacy of
new abatement technology, and the economic implications of imposing that burden on one or another segment of the agriculture
industry.
But let's leave these issues where they are for the moment. To truly understand the implications of civic environmentalism's sudden
popularity, it is necessary to turn our attention to Capitol Hill.
Congress Reacts
Dissatisfaction with command-and-control regulation is a cornerstone of civic environmentalism. Moderate proponents believe that
there is a role for traditional rules in some contexts, but argue that sharp departures are warranted with respect to the second-generation
problems that confront us. The proponents of more radical "bottom-up" collaboration argue that new ways must be found to address all
environmental problems. These theorists would clear away the underbrush of traditional regulation to allow grass-roots democracy to
bloom.
But what exactly do we mean by "traditional, command-and-control" regulation? One might suppose that the answer to this threshold
question would be clear. Unfortunately, it is not. As civic environmentalism evolves from theory into practice, programs are targeted
for reasons that contradict its core principles.
For example, so-called technology-based standards are the bane of the reinvention movement because they are economically inefficient
and imposed from the "top-down" by Washington bureaucrats.48 Conversely, reinventors extol the virtues of "health-based performance
standards" that are tailored to address the specific conditions of a place—for example, an ecosystem or a watershed.49 Yet the first
instance of Congress adopting—and corrupting—civic environmentalism occurred in the context of its efforts to halt a program that is a
performance-based, health-based, and locally derived alternative to the precise type of national standards that are derided by the
reinventors.
While the terminology used in this particular corner of the reinvention debate is especially confusing, the phrase "technology-based
standards" is used here, as it is by critics of the existing system, to connote requirements that sources achieve emissions limits because
such levels of control can be produced by installing the "best available" technology. These technology-based standards must be
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distinguished from "health-based" emissions limits that are established because emissions in excess of such limits will harm human
health or the environment. So-called performance standards can take both forms, of course, establishing a goal either because available
technology is capable of achieving it or because the achievement of the goal is necessary to protect health or the environment.
Reinventors ostensibly prefer health-based performance standards because they impose only the amount of compliance costs that is
absolutely necessary to ensure protection, as opposed to the potentially excessive costs of installing pollution control technology that
achieves more than the necessary emissions reductions. At any rate, in this context, I refer to the health-based performance standards
that are required, but have yet to be developed, under the CWA, as opposed to the pure technology-based performance standards that
have been the centerpiece of the Act's implementation up until this point.
To return to the story of congressional co-option of civic environmentalism, EPA recently announced that 40% of the nation's surface
water bodies are too polluted for fishing and swimming, despite the implementation of technology-based controls.50 These shortfalls in
pollution control have focused renewed attention on the regulatory alternative specified by the CWA—establishment of TMDLs for
impaired water bodies.51 Responsibility for crafting TMDLs, river-by-river and lake-by-lake, is assigned to the states and is an
historical vestige of the federal government's reluctance to assume responsibility for local water [30 ELR 10915] quality.52 As the
name implies, TMDLs are the total ambient concentration of a pollutant that a specific water body can absorb and still meet applicable
water quality standards. It is as if the congressional authors of the CWA foresaw the charges that have been leveled against their
reliance on pure technology-based standards and constructed an alternative designed to meet civic environmentalism's core
specifications.
The states ignored the mandate to establish TMDLs until about 15 years ago, when environmental organizations brought lawsuits
challenging this inaction, accumulating a string of victories from federal courts across the country.53 As the litigation proliferated, EPA
adopted one approach to civic environmentalism already endorsed by Congress: as authorized by the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
it convened a Federal Advisory Committee of public- and private-sector stakeholders and set about hammering out the details of a new
TMDL program.54 In the summer of 1998, the Committee issued a report recommending that the program be strengthened.55 A year
later, having achieved consensus, EPA responded to these recommendations by proposing two rules to guide state implementation of
TMDL requirements.56
A political firestorm ensued, with waves of different interest groups flocking to Congress, demanding that it stop EPA in its tracks.57
Large industrial point sources have a strong incentive to delay or derail the program because they fear that they will bear the brunt of
further reductions when federal and state regulators tire of coping with numerous, sometimes small nonpoint sources. Farmers large and
small fear exactly the opposite outcome: renewed pressure to rope them into reductions that other dischargers have had to produce for
decades. A vociferous group of states joined the campaign to deflect more stringent federal regulation, further confounding efforts to
negotiate a workable, albeit pluralist, compromise.
Responding to these complaints, Congress passed a rider forbidding EPA to spend fiscal year (FY) 2001 funds to implement any new
rules.58 But in mid-July, EPA Administrator Carol Browner promulgated the rules, although she delayed their effective date until 2001,
effectively honoring the spending injunction imposed by Congress.59 Infuriated by EPA's response to their criticisms of the new rules,
Republican staff threatened that a rewrite of the CWA was essential after the 2000 national election.60
As controversy grew, two groups of powerful Republican lawmakers introduced separate pieces of legislation that foreshadow the
changes they would make in the CWA during the next Congress. The first, introduced by Senate Environment Committee Chairman
Bob Smith (R-N.H.) and Senate Fisheries, Wildlife, and Drinking Water Subcommittee Chairman Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), would
prohibit EPA from promulgating the rules until the National Academy of Sciences prepares a report to Congress.61 The second,
introduced by Sen. Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) and Rep. John Tanner (D-Tenn.) would establish a nationwide network of "watershed
management councils," groups that could form the backbone of a civic republican revival.62 Read together, the legislation indicates the
emergence of a trend in congressional thinking that has the potential to accomplish profound changes in American water quality policy.
Smith/Crapo lays the groundwork for such changes, while Bond/Tanner sketches their future direction.
The Smith/Crapo bill acknowledges the need for significantly expanded information and federal funding to support the TMDL
program, estimating in its findings in support of the legislation that it will cost the states between $ 670 million and $ 1.2 billion to
develop TMDLs "required for currently listed waters."63 However, in a paradox that arguably reveals the sponsors' true intentions, the
bill authorizes only $ 250 million for the implementation of all state water regulatory programs for FYs 2001-2007, instructing that $
50 million of these amounts be given to the states annually to gather monitoring data.64 This sum is obviously a fraction of [30 ELR
10916] what the legislation estimates will be necessary to fully implement TMDLs.
The bill further instructs EPA to contract with the National Academy of Sciences for a study of the "scientific basis underlying the
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development and implementation of [TMDLs]," as well as the costs of implementing the program and the "availability of alternative
programs or mechanisms to reduce the discharge of pollutants from point and nonpoint sources.65 Until the study is complete, EPA
would be barred from proceeding with the two new rules.66 The legislation as a whole appears to be premised on the assumption that
Congress will rely on something other than TMDLs to close the water quality gap.
What that something might be is "comprehensive watershed management strategies (including estuary management programs, source
water protection programs, and other voluntary or statutory programs)," which are described as "important tools to coordinate point
source and nonpoint source water quality programs."67 The legislation asserts that "state and local governments, businesses, and
landowners are expected to spend billions of dollars over the next 20 years to implement the watershed management strategies and
other programs to address nonpoint source pollution."68 So optimistic are the sponsors about the potential of these programs that they
direct EPA to establish a "pilot program" to assess the "relative water quality improvements" that result from "up to 5 state watershed
management programs or strategies."69 What we have, then, is the promise of local watershed management, in the best tradition of civic
environmentalism, without any commitment to deliver, or even continue to require, the performance-based standards—TMDLs—that
civic environmentalists agree are essential to hold local efforts "accountable."
But the story does not end there. Even if it was possible to imagine how watershed management councils comprised of diverse
stakeholders could cope with negotiating protective water quality standards on a river-by-river or lake-by-lake basis, how do we ensure
that these standards reflect the common good? Who will sit on these watershed councils and how will their work be conducted? How,
in short, can we be sure that the full spectrum of enlightened citizens actively participates in the creation of a sufficiently protective,
rolling-rule regime?
The Bond/Tanner bills indicate the congressional majority's latest thinking on this issue. Introduced within hours of the Crapo/Smith
bill, the legislation is entitled the "Fishable Waters Act of 2000."70 The bills achieved wider support than Smith/Crapo, attracting
endorsement not only by a cross-section of agricultural, fishing, and logging industry groups but also two national environmental
organizations, Trout Unlimited and the Izaak Walton League.71
The centerpiece of the legislation is the creation of watershed management councils that would implement "voluntary, non-regulatory,
incentive-based program[s],"72 including "comprehensive fisheries habitat protection, restoration, and enhancement plan[s]" that would
characterize water quality in the watershed.73 In what one journalist has termed a "direct slap" at EPA, federal responsibility for
supervising state and local conveners of the councils would be assigned to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the DOI.74
Significantly, the legislation provides that "nothing in this section requires any person to undertake or refrain from taking any action
under an recommendation contained in an approved plan . . . unless willing written consent is obtained from each person holding a
property interest in the land affected by the action."75
Consistent with this explicit protection of property rights, councils would be "voluntary" organizations that do not "possess" either
"direct or indirect regulatory authority."76 They should have a membership that is "fairly balanced, in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions to be performed" and is "representative of the interests within the watershed that may be affected by the
activities of the council (including tribal, private, public, governmental, and nonprofit interests)."77 However, as if to underscore the
discretion afforded conveners in selecting such groups, states are directed to consider the "balance and representation of the
membership of the council" when making decisions to approve or disapprove the councils' comprehensive plans.78 Thus, the councils
should attempt to include a "fairly balanced" group of "representatives" of "interests," but the legislation does not impose even minimal
requirements regarding the relative numbers of participants representing different interests or even that there be a quorum before
binding votes are taken.
The adoption of civic environmental alternatives such as the Bond/Tanner legislation is extraordinarily attractive because it allows all
the participants to claim they are supporting the revitalization of local, grass-roots democracy rather than gutting the CWA. In the
heady aftermath of such short-term victories, civic republicans may find it difficult to remember the risk that key elements of their
proposals will drop by the wayside in practice, from the development of performance-based standards to preserving the integrity of
local civic collaboration. The next and final section considers these two indispensable attributes of civic environmentalism, arguing that
unless they are preserved, civic environmentalism will be corrupted—as a movement, as a set of ideals, and as an alternative to the
existing regulatory system.
Accountability and Participation
Performance-Based Standards
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Civic environmentalists envision a dramatically reduced role for the federal government. Rather than setting the bar, telling regulated
industries what to do, and ensuring that [30 ELR 10917] state regulators punish those who fall short, all but the first function would
devolve to the state or local level. The result would leave the federal government—or, in the words of Sabel, Karkkainen, and Fung, a
"central authority"—to set the bar periodically and then retreat to the sidelines, perhaps playing the "supportive" role of generating
information about the experiences of local collaborators.79
However diminished this view of the appropriate federal role, the importance of the responsibility to set the bar cannot be overstated.
Civic environmentalism, wherever and however it is practiced, must have benchmarks to hold local groups accountable for delivering
adequate results. Without that mechanism, the enterprise becomes little more than a set of social clubs for like-minded individuals
engaging in activities that are laudable, but hardly capable of replacing traditional regulation.
Civic environmentalists have yet to focus much attention on how to establish benchmarks, apart from embracing the performance-based
approach that is the remedy of choice among other advocates of reinvention. Performance-based standards identify a goal for
improvement of the condition of the ambient environment and then allow regulated industries, under the supervision of state regulators,
to decide how to go about controlling their activities to the point where the goal is met.80
Obviously, there are many ways to establish performance goals. The simplest approach is to call for reductions in current pollution
levels, measured either numerically (e.g., X tons) or as a percentage less than a baseline of existing emissions (e.g., X% of actual
emissions in 1995). At the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of complexity are goals that reflect a judgment about the desirable
condition of the ambient environment (e.g., we will restore this lake or river to a condition where it is fishable and swimmable).
The difficulty with the first, relatively simple approach is that we can never be sure whether the prescribed reductions will be sufficient
to preserve environmental quality or, conversely, will be more than what must be done topreserve environmental quality. It is no small
irony that "pure" technology-based standards suffer from precisely this problem: they are designed to produce the best reductions that
state-of-the-art equipment can deliver, as opposed to the reductions that are absolutely needed to provide adequate protection. To be
true to their campaign against "rigid," "one-size-fits-all," "top-down" regulation, civic environmentalists should reject this method of
establishing performance-based standards as repetitive of past mistakes.81
Instead, civic environmentalists should embrace whole-heartedly the alternative method of establishing performance-based standards—
setting goals on the basis of the condition of the ambient environment. Whether they advocate a regime based on rolling rules or are
more comfortable with a set of transparent,82 well-supported, and relatively permanent performance standards, the only way to serve all
of civic environmentalism's core values is to assess the condition of the ambient environment and regulate accordingly. In fact, the
establishment of TMDLs under the CWA is arguably the best example of such a "performance-based standard" ever established under
federal law.
The difficulty with this approach, of course, is that it requires us to know a great deal not only about the actual condition of the ambient
environment but about the implications of its contamination. In other words, we need to know not only whether the water is
contaminated by chemical X at Y levels, but also the nature and scope of the hazard that chemical X at Y levels poses to human health
and the environment. And it is here that civic environmentalism meets one of its two biggest challenges and is so vulnerable to
corruption.
To revisit once again the situation on Capitol Hill, it is no secret to anyone even vaguely familiar with the federal and state struggle to
implement the CWA that huge gaps in information have stymied efforts to write and implement TMDLs. Not only do the relevant
congressional leaders recognize this distressing reality, they recently commissioned a comprehensive U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) study documenting those data gaps.83 But rather than invoke the GAO report to support a renewed effort to develop the
necessary information, the legislators instead used the report to justify their demand that EPA back off efforts to strengthen the program.
The GAO report found that EPA's National Water Quality Inventory does not accurately portray water quality conditions nationwide
because the "states collectively assess only a small percentage of waters in the United States."84 Specifically, the states monitor only
19% of the nation's rivers and streams and 6% of its oceans and other shoreline waters.85 GAO acknowledged that it would be "costprohibitive to physically monitor all of the waters in the country." However, it concluded that "most monitoring is not done in a way
that allows for statistically valid assessments of water quality conditions in unmonitored waters."86 To compound these problems,
wide variation exists in (1) the way that individual states select their monitoring sites, (2) the kinds of tests they perform
on their waters and how the results of these tests are interpreted, and (3) the methods they use to determine the causes and
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sources of pollution in waters that do not meet water quality standards.87
[30 ELR 10918]
The Smith/Crapo legislation responds to these recommendations by agreeing that the states do not know enough to set TMDLs and
observing that they do not have the resources to carry out the statute's mandates.88 But rather than pledging significant federal support
to help the states address such data gaps, the bill authorizes only $ 50 million annually to support state monitoring programs.89 Any
remaining data gaps presumably would be left to watershed councils and the states themselves to fill.
To further demonstrate the implications of data gaps on the implementation of accountable civic environmentalism, consider the other
side of the equation: not only must we measure ambient conditions, we must make a value judgment about what the inevitable levels of
contamination mean for human health and environmental quality. Our ignorance regarding the risks to public health posed by common
pollutants is shocking. In a recent report covering 2,863 organic chemicals produced or imported in amount above one million pounds
annually, EPA concluded that there is no toxicity information available for 43% of such chemicals and that a full set of basic toxicity
information is available for only 7%.90 These yawning data gaps undermine all of the Agency's efforts to establish priorities, assess
risk, and achieve results, and the notion that local groups could surmount them is fanciful. Indeed, it makes no sense for individual local
watershed management councils, or even the states, to attempt to plug these gaps when the federal government can do this work much
more efficiently, distributing the information to all the states.
To restore the integrity of their ideas, civic environmentalists must start talking about the demands and the costs of a credible,
performance-based alternative to the traditional regulatory system. Unless they do, there will indeed be watershed management
councils in more areas of the country, but these groups will lack the information they need to measure progress, much less to hold
themselves accountable for achieving results.
How participants will react when they are thrust into such a situation depends on who they are, and it is to that final, all-important topic
that we now turn.
Citizens Versus Professionals
As much as there is to admire in John's thoughtful work, one cannot help but feel that his suggestion that a "shadow community" of
mid-level bureaucrats is the embodiment of civic environmentalism sells short the movement's true vision.91 His descriptions of the
efforts of such committed individuals in Iowa may justify the enlightened devolution of federal authority.92 But it is not the
revitalization of "backyard" democracy sought by his fellow theorists. For that, authentic representatives of those elusive concepts the
"public interest" and the "common good" must be found.
For decades, the obvious choice to fill this role has been the paid staff of national and state environmental organizations. But most
national environmental groups have suffered a wave of downsizing in the last several years.93 Some ascribe this phenomenon to the
popular assumption that with Al Gore in the White House, watchdogs are not needed any more. Others argue that the national groups
have failed to articulate a vision capable of attracting widespread public support. Whatever the reason, as collaborative, consensusbuilding "dialogues" have become more common, and the hostility of Congress to traditional regulation has grown, the staffs of
national groups and their state affiliates have made a conscious choice to focus on a rearguard battle to preserve past victories, rather
than spending time in collaborative negotiations with their historic foes.94 The bottom line is that the relatively small number of
professional environmentalists are unlikely to volunteer to participate in localized efforts to renegotiate regulation until they are
convinced that they have no alternative.
Civic environmentalists have made a virtue of this reality, arguing that professional environmentalists are inevitably prey to an "interest
group" mentality that precludes their flexible and constructive involvement in local efforts.95 Rather, the only reliable representatives of
the public interest are average citizens who may have an affiliation with organized groups, but do not earn their livelihood in such
endeavors.96
At the outset of this Dialogue, I described civic environmentalists as idealistic and sincere, two adjectives that, depending on the
context, are not always complimentary. The negative aspects of these characteristics are manifested most clearly in the double standard
that civic environmentalists apply to the question of who will sit at the table with public volunteers. Civic environmentalists refuse to
consider who will represent commercial interests. If professionals from organized environmental groups are to be excluded from the
collaborations, either because they cannot afford to participate or because they would be disruptive, what about the professionals who
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earn their living by representing heavy industry, agribusiness, logging and timber concerns, small business, developers, banks, etc.?
Because civic environmentalists do not address in any normative way either how commercial representatives should be selected or [30
ELR 10919] the ground rules for their participation, the fact that such representatives will have a dominating presence in local councils
is taken as a given.
This premise is objectionable—even disgraceful—for several reasons. The first is the hypocrisy of the double standard that would
assume, on one hand, that representatives of organized commercial interests are legitimate, but would question the legitimacy of
similarly situated public interest representatives. Either one rejects pluralism (the thesis that mediating between clashing interest groups
is the role of democratic government) or one does not.
The second, more practical and important problem is the character of the discussions that will ensue given these threshold assumptions.
Eileen Gauna and Jonathan Poisner have written eloquently about the hopelessness of expecting average citizens to engage in debates
that cast policy choices in highly technical terms.97 Indeed, I would go so far as to posit that there is not a single person earning his or
her living in the environmental arena who can, with a straight face, propose that their lay friends would last long in such conversations
without substantial technical support. By failing to consider the nature and scope of participation by representatives of commercial
interests, civic environmentalists tacitly accept that a highly technical debate is not just likely, but inevitable.
To have integrity, civic environmentalists must either work to insist that collaborative groups frame issues in transparent, nontechnical,
and readily understandable terms, or they must advocate that average citizens have the technical support they need to participate. But
they cannot wash their hands of these difficult questions, depending on the emergence of civic virtue from situations that would give
even Thomas Jefferson pause.
The first alternative—a transparent, nontechnical debate—requires stringent limits on who sits at the table and who sets the agenda. It is
very difficult to envision its faithful implementation in the real world, given the well-organized, well-financed, and understandably avid
involvement of local, state, national, and even international business in efforts that may affect regulatory requirements. Civic
environmentalists may remain hopeful about the development of easily understood performance-based standards. But they cannot really
expect affected businesses to refrain from debating either the validity or the achievement of performance-based measures in any given
local situation. Such challenges may arise out of self-interest, or they may be genuine expressions of concern we avoid squandering
money on unnecessary pollution controls. Whatever the motivation, the establishment of performance-based standards does not, in and
of itself, resolve the problem of keeping the debate transparent so that it is accessible to lay participants.
The second alternative—allowing commercial representatives to volunteer freely and the debate to become highly technical—is the
inevitable result of civic environmental theory as it stands today. The question then becomes whether average citizens are given the
resources they need to actually participate.
Subsidies for Technical Assistance
The issue of whether and how to provide technical assistance to grass-roots citizens engaged in local collaboration is well-known in
national policy circles, and is typically met with one of two reactions by government and industry. The first reaction is that local
citizens do not need such assistance because any support they require can be provided by federal, state, and local bureaucrats. The
second reaction is that, while it is understandable why citizens feel they need such assistance, the pitfalls of providing it overwhelm
those legitimate needs.
Given their assertion that citizens rightfully distrust bureaucrats, civic environmentalists should be reluctant to advance the first
argument. Citizen distrust deepens when there are no limits on the participation of experts who work for affected businesses, potentially
overwhelming the efforts of government experts to serve in the role of honest broker in evaluating the technical issues at stake.
Whether perceptions of industry dominance are true or not, an atmosphere poisoned by perceptions is an atmosphere ruined just the
same.
As for the second argument—that the pitfalls of awarding such grants overwhelm their advantages—the basic fear is that the money
will be misappropriated by illegitimate groups. The premier program for providing technical assistance to local citizen groups, which is
authorized at Superfund national priorities list (NPL) sites, addresses these concerns by capping grants at $ 50,000.98 Citizens use these
meager grants to understand government decisions. Whether these amounts would be sufficient in a regime that assigned responsibility
for making technical decisions to citizens acting in collaboration with government and industry is doubtful.
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In any event, no one has suggested extending the Superfund approach to major regulatory programs. In fact, when confronted with this
problem in the context of Project XL, the reinvention initiative often cited as a premier example of grass-roots democracy in action,
EPA responded by requiring citizens to obtain the agreement of all the other major stakeholder groups before receiving technical
assistance of their own.99
Recruiting average people to participate in the resolution of complex issues, in a context where even the ultimate standards for
measuring success are up for grabs, with no independent technical support, and without imposing any limits on industry and
government's participation, inflicts a handicap that would not be tolerated by any other group of participants. Yet the most daunting
impediment to grass-roots democracy is not the difficulty of holding one's own in such conversations, but the time it takes to participate.
The "Vanity of Volunteerism"
The experiments in collaboration over the last decade or so have been very time-consuming. In perhaps the most infamous [30 ELR
10920] example, the Project XL negotiation at an Intel facility in Arizona, the agreement was hammered out in 100 meetings, each
lasting 4 to 6 hours, over a period of 10 months.100 To accommodate citizen representatives, many of these meetings were held at night.
Regulatory negotiations have a similar reputation for requiring an enormous commement of time and energy, but typically do not make
the concession of meeting at night, probably because the professionals from industry and government are unwilling to make such an
extraordinary sacrifice of their personal time. These details should not be dismissed as petty. Unless one is willing to stipulate, at the
threshold, that people who work cannot participate, the issue of when meetings are held becomes very important, along with the
question of how much time the meetings will consume. Or, to put the point more rudely, unless one's definition of the average citizen is
either a relatively affluent retired person, or an even more affluent younger person, such details determine the essential character of the
collaboration.
In a recent New York Times article entitled The Vanity of Volunteerism, Sara Mosle, a former elementary school teacher in the inner city
who stopped teaching a decade ago but has tried to continue mentoring herformer students, challenges the capacity of volunteers to take
over the government's role in providing vital services to the poor:
"Compassionate conservatives" would probably claim that I am the kind of "caring adult" who can transform the lives of
disadvantaged kids more effectively than any government program. I am all for volunteering, but I would disagree. . . .
To work, mentoring has to be performed consistently, over a sustained period of time . . . . For the first couple of years
[after I stopped teaching], I saw my kids as often as twice a week. But now I'm lucky if I see them once a month . . . . In
their lives, I'm less a caring adult than a random one. And my failure is representative. Although 55[%] of Americans
reported that they volunteered at some point in 1998—a 7[%] rise over 1995 . . . Americans donated 400 million fewer
hours in 1998 than they [did] in 1995.101
It is possible, of course, that Mosle's observations are of marginal relevance to the projects proposed by civic environmentalists.
Perhaps simple charity is less appealing than the prospect of spending hours debating the technical nuances of environmental trade offs
in groups where industry and government experts predominate. Even if one is willing to make this assumption, however, the serious
problem of available time remains unresolved.
Most Americans are trapped in a syndrome that leaves them with very little discretionary time. On average, Americans work 1,957
hours a year, more than in other, comparably affluent countries.102 Married couples with children now work a combined 3,395 hours
annually, 8 work-weeks more than in 1979, an increase attributable primarily to the growing numbers of women who work.103 Married
couples spent, on average, 14 more hours per week working in 1998 than in 1969, and more mothers, including single mothers, have
joined the work force.104 In 1969, only 23% of women with children under three were in the work force, but by 1998 that figure jumped
to 63%.105 As a result, the average mother and father spends 22 hours less every week with their children than parents did in 1969.106
The syndrome, popularly known as the "time-crunch," is not confined to managerial and professional jobs; rather, a decline in real
wages means that blue collar workers must put in more hours to support their families.107 Production and nonsupervisory workers, who
make up 80% of the work force, must now work 6 more weeks annually to maintain the same standard of living as comparable workers
had in 1973.108 Obviously, this problem grows more acute as income levels drop, an issue underscored by the growing discrepancy in
compensation between the upper and the middle or lower classes: in 1979, the average American college graduate earned 38% more
than the average high school graduate but the gap today is 71%.109 The result is less free time for adults and a ubiquitous and valid
preoccupation with the price the time-crunch exacts from family, much less public, life.
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Of course, there are notable examples of people from all walks of life finding time to engage in civic pursuits. Juries are one example,
school boards and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) are another. But such institutions have attributes that suggest they are not
precursors of success for civic environmentalism.
Juries are so embedded in American culture that there is significant pressure on employers not to interfere with such service. People are
paid, albeit nominally, for their time, and face a call to service only occasionally.
Service in the public schools is motivated, first and foremost, by a concern for the education received by the volunteer's children, a
subject of unrivaled importance for most people. School boards control significant budgets, giving them real power over the outcome of
the educational enterprise. School boards and PTAs may require toleration of lengthy meetings and outbreaks of strife, but both are
supported by professional staff who are responsible for carrying out the main task before them.
Under civic environmental theory, local collaborative groups are unlikely to share any of these attributes. Funding to support the work
of such groups, or to implement the plans they develop, is never mentioned. Even more important, an explanation of why people would
feel motivated to volunteer is relegated to anecdote. Consequently, it is possible to imagine how upper class, well-educated people
living in the countryside near the Chesapeake Bay could feel motivated to spend some of their spare time debating how to preserve the
bay's natural beauty. It is far more difficult to imagine how single mothers in the inner city, having made [30 ELR 10921] the link
between air pollution and their children's bouts with asthma, will be similarly motivated and have the resources to volunteer to spend
seemingly unlimited time in contentious meetings debating in highly technical terms whether and how to clean up the air with the
manufacturers of diesel buses, the owners of trash incinerators and power plants, state and local bureaucrats, and a veritable army of
associated technical experts.
It is, of course, always easier to poke holes in a bold vision for fundamental change than it is to craft one. Civic environmentalists may
have answers to all of the above objections that they have yet to explain. But until they begin to address these issues, with care and in
detail, their theories will remain idealistic and sincere, but extraordinarily vulnerable to corruption.
Cleaner? Smarter? Cheaper?
In conclusion, it is worth returning to the promise that reinvention will produce results that are cleaner, cheaper, and smarter. Whether a
dramatic or even a gradual shift to civic environmentalism has the potential toproduce cleaner and smarter results is anyone's guess,
although in the absence of performance-based standards, it is difficult to see how it could.
Further, as John and Knopman recognize, every example of civic environmentalism in action has occurred in the context of a regulatory
system that carries the ultimate threat of either a fallback to command and control or severe financial liability. What would happen if
this safety net was removed, either directly by legislation or indirectly by Congress' failure to fund the implementation of traditional
regulatory programs, is more than a little fright-ening to contemplate.
But there can be little doubt that civic environmentalism will be a more expensive alternative, especially in the short term, if it is
carried out in accordance with the civic environmentalists' stated ideals. Gathering and organizing the information necessary to impose
effective performance-based standards will be very expensive, as will the financial support that should be provided to "level the playing
field" for local groups.
This, then, brings us to what is, in many ways, the ultimate dilemma. As long as we are in the throes of denying that reinvention will
cost money, we will not end up with reinvention as advocated by the academy. Rather, those ideas will be co-opted to justify not rolling
rules but roll-backs, not grass-roots democracy but the worst pluralism has to offer: participation by industry in a process where the
public interest is unrepresented.
1. Three representative examples of this literature are: DEWITT JOHN, CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM, ALTERNATIVES TO
REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES (1994) [hereinafter JOHN]; Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard
Environmentalism, How Communities Are Quietly Refashioning Environmental Regulation, BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 1999, at 4
[hereinafter Backyard Environmentalism]; and Debra S. Knopman et al., Civic Environmentalism: Tackling Tough Land-Use Problems
With Innovative Governance, 41 ENV'T 24 (1999) [hereinafter Innovative Governance]. The Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen piece is
accompanied by several short commentaries by other authors, some critical and some supportive, including one by DeWitt John.
2. The Tragedy of the Commons posits that each individual citizen has such a small stake in the health of the environment that these
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common resources will be squandered unless extraordinary steps are taken to preserve them either by government or private
organizations representing the public interest. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The
possibility that states will engage in a "race-to-the-bottom" to weaken environmental regulation is an equally well-known political
theory invoked to justify federal environmental law. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 118-120 (3d ed. 2000).
Civic environmentalists reject these fundamental premises of modern environmental law because they believe that if problems are
identified and resolved on a sufficiently local level, not only will a critical mass of average citizens be galvanized to action, but
regulation will be appropriately stringent regardless of the effects of interjurisdictional economic competition.
3. TMDLs are mandated at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d), ELR STAT. FWPCA § 303(d). The legislation is: S. 2417, 106th Cong. (2000); S.
2441, 106th Cong. (2000); and H.R. 4278, 106th Cong. (2000).
4. The last reauthorizations of the CWA and the Clean Air Act took place 13 and 10 years ago, respectively, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 102
Stat. 1018 (codified in scattered sections of 33 and 42 U.S.C.) (CWA); Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in 42 U.S.C.)
(CAA). Since the 1994 national elections, Congress has been gridlocked on every piece of major environmental legislation that does
not enjoy overwhelming bipartisan support.
5. See, e.g., SUMMARY REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: THE PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE BY THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, reprinted in Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) June 23, 1995, at A-121 [hereinafter
SUMMARY REPORT].
6. Civic republicanism was the subject of a symposium issue of the Yale Law Journal published in July 1988, featuring articles by such
respected intellects as Paul Brest, Michael Fitts, Jonathan Macey, Jerry Mashaw, Frank Michelman, Kathleen Sullivan, and Cass
Sunstein, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). Among the more notable recent advocacy on the subject that includes environmental examples of
its potential application are two articles by Jody Freeman published in 1997 and 2000: Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) and The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman I
and Freeman II]. For a comprehensive, eminently readable treatment of the subject, see DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND
THE POLITICS OF PLACE (1990) [hereinafter KEMMIS].
7. KEMMIS, supra note 6, at 9-13 (describing Jefferson's beliefs at the time).
8. For a description of republican theory in modern times, see Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539.
1546-58 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein].
9. KEMMIS, supra note 6, at 19-24 (explaining the theoretical link between agrarian society and civic virtues).
10. Id. at 64-83 (describing what it would mean to restore these values).
11. Id. at 13-19 (describing Madison's beliefs at the time).
12. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1542-47 (explaining pluralism and its history).
13. KEMMIS, supra note 6, at 18-19 (describing the constitutional compromise). See also Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493, 1508-10 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman] and Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1558-64 (describing the hybrid government
that emerged from this dialogue).
14. KEMMIS, supra note 6, at 13.
15. For a grim account of the damage inflicted by the growth of the administrative state and the "stalemate" in contemporary politics,
see id. at 44-63.
16. Norman Ornstein, E-Democracy Sounds Great but Watch Out, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 1999, at 19A.
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17. Michelman, supra note 13, at 1495. See also Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1539 (noting that "various strategies of exclusion of the
nonpropertied, blacks, and women were built into the republican tradition").
18. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureacratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992)
("having administrative agencies set government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism's call for
deliberative decisionmaking informed by the values of the entire polity") [hereinafter Seidenfeld I]. It is worth noting that a more recent
article by Professor Seidenfeld is less enthusiastic about the potential of government to fill this role. Instead, he predicts that attempts to
involve actual members of the public, including representatives of public interest groups, will fail because such individuals will not
cooperate in the collaboration between industry and government and, as a result, will be expelled from such decisionmaking. The
resulting "deals" between industry and government will rightfully be suspect, calling into question the viability of collaborative
decisionmaking as an alternative to traditional regulation. Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the
Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411 (2000) [hereinafter Seidenfeld II].
19. See, e.g., Freeman I, supra note 6.
20. Id. at 75-77.
21. Id. at 77-82.
22. Id. at 41-66.
23. In other articles, I have argued that incremental, site-specific experiments are not worth the resources they cost and that sweeping
reform will require the comprehensive review of each major federal environmental statute. See Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 185-86 (1998)
[hereinafter Dangerous Journey]. For a contrary view, see Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-ent Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA's
Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton Administration's Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129.
24. JOHN, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 118-20 (discussing likely future developments in Iowa); 191-97 (discussing the future of the Florida Everglades dispute).
26. Id. at 260.
27. Innovative Governance, supra note 1, at 32.
28. Id. They offer acid rain and global climate change as examples of problems that must be solved at the national or international level.
29. Id. at 26 (CWA) and 29 (Superfund).
30. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 32.
32. Backyard Environmentalism, supra note 1.
33. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
34. This point was made by Professor Cass Sunstein in his commentary on the article by Sabel, Karkkainen, and Fung. Id. at 22.
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of the poultry industry on the Delmarva peninsula) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON REPORT]. The commission was convened by
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48. For an example of prominent critique of technology-based controls, see Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).
49. See, e.g., JOHN, supra note 1, at 289-302; Innovative Governance, supra note 1, at 27; and Backyard Environmentalism, supra note
1, at 5-6.
50. Margaret Kriz, Testing the Waters at the EPA, 32 NAT'L J. 1286, 1287 (2000).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d), ELR STAT. FWPCA § 303(d).
52. For a history of this and related aspects of the history of the CWA, see Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water
Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10329 (July 1997).
53. For a history of this litigation, see Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based
Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10391 (Aug. 1997).
54. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-15. For an explanation of the purposes of the Act and recent problems with its implementation, see Thomas C.
Beierle & Rebecca J. Long, Chilling Collaboration: The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Stakeholder Involvement in
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Environmental Decisionmaking, 29 ELR 10399 (July 1999). For an analysis of the Federal Advisory Committee's work in the context
of related developments at EPA, at other federal agencies, and in the courts, see Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for
the Clean Water Act's Ambient Standards Program, 28 ELR 10415 (Aug. 1998).
55. TMDL Advisory Group Recommends Implementation Plan to Improve Program, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 742 (Aug. 7, 1998).
56. U.S. EPA, Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46012 (Aug. 23, 1999); U.
S. EPA, Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program and Federal Anti-Degradation Policy in Support of
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46058 (Aug. 23, 1999).
57. Kriz, supra note 50, at 1286; Susan Bruninga, Pressure Mounts on EPA Officials to Withdraw Proposal on Impaired Waters, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA), June 5, 2000, at A-5.
58. Susan Bruninga, Final TMDL Rule Signed by Browner, Prompting Criticism From Hill, Industry, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), July 12,
2000, at AA-1 (reporting on the passage of the rider in the context of an emergency spending bill) [hereinafter Final Rule Signed].
President Clinton signed the bill into law on July 13. Lorraine Woellert, It's Open Season on the EPA, BUS. WK., July 31, 2000, at 48.
59. Final TMDL Rule Signed, supra note 58. The two rules were published in the Federal Register on the same day that President
Clinton signed the rider into law. U.S. EPA, Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management
Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43585 (July 13, 2000).
60. Kriz, supra note 50, at 1287.
61. S. 2417, 106th Cong. §§ 4 and 6 (2000). The Almanac of America, Politics describes the two senators voting records as "very
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Representative Tanner's was 38%. Id. at 922-25, 928-29, 1499-501 (profiling Senator Bond and Representative Tanner).
62. S. 2441, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 4278, 106th Cong. (2000).
63. S. 2417, 106th Cong. § 2 (2000).
64. Id. § 3.
65. Id. § 4(a).
66. Id. § 6.
67. Id. § 2(4).
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place cannot afford to play such games.").
97. Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3
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98. 42 U.S.C. § 9617(e), ELR STAT. CERCLA § 117(e).
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Involvement, Industry Says, INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Oct. 25, 1996, at 20.
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103. Id. at 92.
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